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Abstract
This paper examines how pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension reform from
a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme aects fiscal sus-
tainability and economic growth in an overlapping generations model with
endogenous growth. We show that in economies in which the old-age depen-
dency ratio is high and the size of pension benefits under a defined-benefit
scheme is large, such a pension reform mitigates the negative eect of popu-
lation aging on fiscal sustainability and economic growth. However, we also
show that this type of pension reform entails an intergenerational conflict
of interest between current and future generations. Population aging might
exacerbate the extent of this conflict.
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1 Introduction
During the last half century, the demographic structure of all developed nations
changed dramatically. Due to the decline in both fertility and mortality rates, the
relative share of elderly persons in society increased rapidly, and this trend is pre-
dicted to persist for years to come.1 Such rapid population aging and the resulting
increases in social security expenses place enormous pressure on government fi-
nancing in these nations. Japan is now confronting the most severe such situation
in the world. According to the OECD economic outlook for 2015, Japan’s gross
government debt reached 230% of GDP on a gross basis, the highest among all
OECD countries. Oguro (2014) argues that these recent increases in the govern-
ment debt-GDP ratio in Japan are attributable primarily to the rapidly swelling
social security costs due to population aging.2 Chronic fiscal deficits and social
security financing are closely related . 3 At present, many OECD countries face a
host of challenges to achieving fiscal sustainability.
Faced with these challenges, many developed countries have implemented a
series of social security reforms since the 1990s. In particular, countries such as
Japan, Denmark, and Italy have abandoned the traditional practice of continuously
increasing contributions to maintain pension benefits for the elderly. Instead, they
employ a demographically modified indexation program. Most countries that em-
ploy pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems maintain elderly living standards by
adjusting pension benefits to maintain the ratio of pensions to average wages of
working generations at a constant value (i.e., wage indexation). Under this type of
defined-benefit PAYG pension scheme, declining birth rates and aging populations
have necessitated increases in the pension contributions of younger generations.
However, because of the rapid pace at which populations are aging, the conven-
tional approach (i.e., increasing contributions to maintain pension benefit levels)
imposes an excessive burden on younger and future generations through a hike
in the social security tax rate or the issuance of government debt. Under a de-
1For example, in Japan, the share of the population aged 65 and older (i.e., the old-age depen-
dency ratio) in 1990 was 12%. By 2005, the elderly share of the population had risen to 20%.
Government projections by the National Institute of Population and Social Security indicate that
this figure will reach 40% by 2060.
2Social security payments in Japan are partly funded by the state budget. Therefore, govern-
ment deficits and social security financing are closely related. For example, the sum of social
security spending for fiscal 2013, 110 trillion yen, consists of approximately 60 trillion yen in
social insurance premiums and approximately 10 trillion yen in revenue from asset management,
and the shortfall of approximately 40 trillion yen is to be paid with public funds from local and
central governments.
3An IMF report on the Japanese economy (2009) argues that fiscal and social security reform
is an critical issue in Japan and suggests that Japan should increase its consumption tax rate to
15% to secure a stable source of revenues to ensure that its social security obligations are met.
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mographically modified indexation program, however, if the number of workers
supporting the pension system decreases, then the wage indexation rate for pen-
sion benefits also decreases, even if the average wages of the working generations
increase. Hence, pensions for the elderly are adjusted automatically based on
changes in demographic conditions. This introduction of a demographically mod-
ified indexation program paves the way for a cap on future contribution increases
or a fixed-contribution PAYG pension scheme. For example, the 2004 pension
reform in Japan shifted away from the standard practice of increasing employee
pension contributions to guarantee a 59% benefit level and instead capped future
contributions at 18.3% (i.e., a fixed-contribution program). In addition, Japan in-
troduced a demographically modified indexation program to ensure that the size
of pension benefits was consistent with the new contribution cap.4 At present,
many other OECD countries are introducing automatic pension benefit adjust-
ment mechanisms and modified indexation systems to prevent unrestricted future
contribution or government debt increases.5 From a theoretical perspective, these
recent PAYG pension reforms signify a transition from defined-benefit schemes to
defined-contribution schemes.
Motivated by these recent policy experiences in several OECD countries, this
paper examines PAYG pension reform from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-
contribution scheme aects fiscal sustainability and economic growth in an over-
lapping generations (OLG) model with endogenous growth and public debt. In
the present analysis, the government employs a defined-benefit PAYG pension
scheme with wage indexation and finances it through wage income tax and debt
issuance. The government also conforms to the constant budget deficit-GDP ratio
rule. Under these fiscal and social security policies, there can be two long-run
equilibria, one locally stable and one locally unstable, and the locally unstable
equilibrium determines the upper limit of the initial public debt-capital ratio below
(resp. above) which a fiscal policy is sustainable and the economy converges to
the stable equilibrium (resp. a fiscal policy is no longer sustainable). We consider
a fiscal policy sustainable if there exists an initial value of the public debt-capital
ratio such that the ratio converges to some finite value in the long run. We also
consider a fiscal policy more sustainable if the range of the initial public debt-
capital ratio for which the public debt-capital ratio converges to some finite level
becomes wider due to the changes in fiscal policy parameters or demographic
conditions.
Under the framework explained above, this paper shows that a decline in pop-
4The new pension level established by the 2004 pension reform was 50%. For further informa-
tion on the 2004 pension reform in Japan, see, for example, Komamura (2007).
5For example, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Korea and Turkey have each linked future
increases in pension ages to changes in life expectancy. In addition, Sweden introduced a defined-
contribution PAYG pension scheme in 1999. See OECD (2013) for additional details.
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ulation growth rate lowers the upper limit of the initial public debt-capital ratio
below which a fiscal policy is sustainable. We also show that in economies in
which the old-age dependency ratio is high, a decline in population growth rate
negatively aects economic growth. These results imply that population aging
caused by a decline in the population growth rate negatively aects both fiscal
sustainability and economic growth. This negative eect of population aging on
fiscal sustainability has yet to be shown explicitly in the existing literature.
Moreover, this paper shows that in economies in which the old-age depen-
dency ratio is high and the size of pension benefits under a defined-benefit scheme
is large, PAYG pension reform from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution
scheme increases the upper limit of the initial public debt-capital ratio below
which a fiscal policy is sustainable and positively aects economic growth. These
results imply that reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-benefit scheme
to a defined-contribution scheme may mitigate the negative eects of population
aging on fiscal sustainability and economic growth. However, we also show that
this type of PAYG pension reform entails an intergenerational conflict of inter-
est between current and future generations. Population aging might exacerbate
the extent of this conflict. These results imply that such a PAYG pension reform
becomes less feasible in a rapidly aging society.
The present paper relates to the literature that examines the conditions for fis-
cal sustainability in the context of OLG growth models (e.g., Chalk, 2000; Rankin
and Roa, 2003; Bra¨uninger, 2005; Yakita, 2008; Arai, 2011; Rankin, 2014).
This literature defines fiscal sustainability in terms of the existence of a steady-
state equilibrium for a given fiscal policy. Among them, Bra¨uninger (2005) and
Yakita (2008) are closely related to our contribution because these studies em-
ploy an endogenous growth framework. 6 Using an AK-type endogenous growth
model, Bra¨uninger (2005) demonstrates that under a fiscal rule according to which
the public spending-GDP ratio and budget deficit-GDP ratio are constant, there is
a stable steady-state growth path as long as the initial public debt-capital ratio
is below a certain threshold. Using an endogenous growth model with public
capital, Yakita (2008) demonstrates that under the golden rule of public finance
for public investment with a constant budget deficit-GDP ratio, there is a stable
steady-state growth path as long as the initial public debt-capital ratio is below
a certain threshold, which is increasing in the stock of public capital. However,
these studies do not explicitly consider public pensions and are therefore unable
to capture the eects of PAYG pension reform on fiscal sustainability. Therefore,
this paper extends Bra¨uninger (2005) by explicitly incorporating a PAYG pension
6Arai (2011) also employs a Barro (1990) type endogenous growth model with productive
government expenditure and shows that if the public spending-GDP ratio is small, an increase in
the public spending-GDP ratio makes fiscal policy more sustainable.
4
system and examines the eects of population aging and PAYG pension reforms
on fiscal sustainability and economic growth. To the best of our knowledge, these
issues have yet to be examined extensively in the literature.
This paper also relates to the vast body of literature on public pensions and
population aging in the context of OLG models (e.g., Zhang et al. 2001, 2003,
2005; Ono, 2003; Fanti and Gori, 2012; Artige et al, 2014; Tabata, 2015). How-
ever, most of these studies do not consider pension policy together with public
debt. Moreover, there are few analytical studies that examine the eect of a tran-
sition from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme on fiscal
sustainability and economic growth, despite that these types of PAYG pension re-
forms have recently become common among OECD countries. To the best of our
knowledge, Ono (2003) is an exceptional analytical study that analyzes a public
pension financed by public debt. However, Ono (2003) employs a neoclassical
growth framework and does not focus on economic growth or fiscal sustainability
issues. To the best of our knowledge, Artige et al. (2014) and Tabata (2015) are
exceptional studies that compare the macroeconomic performance of a defined-
benefit PAYG pension scheme with that of a defined-contribution PAYG pension
scheme in an aging society. In particular, Tabata (2015) is closely related to our
contribution because it examines how reforming a PAYG pension system from a
defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme aects economic growth
in an endogenous growth model. However, neither Artige et al. (2014) nor Tabata
(2015) consider pension policy together with public debt and are therefore unable
to capture the eects of PAYG pension reforms on fiscal sustainability. Therefore,
this paper extends Tabata (2015) by explicitly incorporating public debt and ex-
amines how reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-benefit scheme to
a defined-contribution scheme aects fiscal sustainability and economic growth in
an OLG model with endogenous growth.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the basic model. Sec-
tion 3 describes the dynamic property of the economy and defines the concept of
fiscal sustainability. Section 4 examines how reforming a PAYG pension system
from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme aects the rela-
tionship between population aging and fiscal sustainability. Section 5 analyzes
how such a pension reform influences the prediction of the eect of population
aging on economic growth. Section 6 discusses the welfare implications of PAYG
pension reform. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a two-period OLG model of endogenous economic growth with a
PAYG pension financed by a wage income tax and debt issuance.
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2.1 Individuals
In each period, Nt individuals are born, and the population grows at the constant
rate n 2 ( 1;1). Individuals born in period t are called by generation t. Indi-
viduals live for a maximum of two periods (youth and old age). In youth, each
individual is endowed with one unit of labor and inelastically supplies it. An indi-
vidual dies at the beginning of old age with probability 1  and lives through old
age with probability  2 (0; 1]. In each period t, there exist only two generations:
the active working young and the retired old. Therefore, the old-age dependency
ratio (i.e., the ratio of old dependents to the young working population) in period
t is given by Nt 1Nt =

1+n . Thus, population aging (i.e., an increase in the old-
age dependency ratio) is triggered if there is either a decrease in the population
growth rate n or an increase in the old-age survival probability . In the following
analysis, to avoid repetitive explanations, we focus primarily on the analysis of
population aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate n. Appendix
A provides some numerical simulation results for the case in which population
aging is caused by an increase in the old-age survival probability rate . Then, we
confirm that the analogous predictions hold in both cases.
Each individual derives utility from his or her own consumption in both youth
and old age. Thus, the lifetime expected utility of an agent in generation t is
expressed as
ut = ln cyt +  ln cot+1; (1)
where cyt is consumption in youth and cot+1 is consumption in old age. As in
Bra¨uninger (2005) and Yakita (2008), the instantaneous utility function is as-
sumed to be logarithmic for the sake of tractability.
In youth, each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor, earns wage
income wt on which the wage income tax is levied at rate t, and allocates his or
her disposable income (1  t)wt to current consumption cyt and saving st. Follow-
ing Blanchard (1985), we assume the existence of actuarially fair insurance for
the sake of simplicity. The insurance company promises each individual a pay-
ment Rt+1

st in exchange for which the individual’s estate st accrues to the company,
where  is the average survival probability and Rt+1 is the gross rate of interest.
In old age, survivors retire and consume their returns on private savings Rt+1

st and
pension benefits Pt+1. Thus, the budget constraints of an agent from generation t
are
c
y
t + st = (1   t)wt; (2)
cot+1 =
Rt+1

st + Pt+1: (3)
By maximizing (1), subject to (2) and (3), we obtain
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st =

1 + 
"
(1   t)wt   Pt+1
Rt+1
#
: (4)
This saving equation states that a higher old-age survival probability  implies
higher savings, whereas both higher pension benefits Pt+1 and higher wage income
tax rates t imply lower savings.
2.2 Production
Each firm has constant returns-to-scale technology, and the aggregate production
function is expressed as
Yt = Kt (AtNt)1 ; (5)
where , Yt, Kt, and Nt denote the fixed technology parameter and the aggregate
levels of output, physical capital, and labor input, respectively. At represents labor
productivity, which is assumed to be driven by a positive spillover from the size
of the aggregate capital stock to the productivity of workers in the manner sug-
gested by Romer (1986). To ensure the existence of a balanced growth path, as
in Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), we assume that At takes the following form
as At  KtNt . We assume that capital fully depreciates within one period. Solving
a representative firm’s problem, we obtain the optimal conditions for the firm as
follows
Rt = 
 
Kt
AtNt
! 1
=  = R; (6)
wt = (1   )At
 
Kt
AtNt
!
= (1   )Kt
Nt
= w¯kt; (7)
where R  , w¯  (1   ) and kt  Kt=Nt. The gross interest rate is constant
over time whereas the wage rate per labor is proportional to the capital per worker.
By using At  KtNt and w¯, GDP per worker is rewritten as
yt  YtNt = k =
w¯
1   kt; (8)
that is, (5) and At  KtNt generate an AK-type production function.
2.3 Government
2.3.1 Budget constraints
The government pursues a social security policy based on a PAYG pension sys-
tem. As there are Nt 1 old agents who receive pension benefits Pt, government
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spending in period t is given by PtNt 1. The government finances its spending
through a wage income tax and the issuance of public debt. Thus, the government’
s budget constraint in period t is
Bt+1 = (1 + r)Bt + PtNt 1   twtNt; (9)
where Bt is the stock of public debt in period t and twtNt is the revenue from a
wage income tax. Because the risk-free gross interest rate is equated to the gross
capital interest rate through arbitrage (i.e., 1+ rt = R), rt is also constant at R (i.e.,
rt = r).
2.3.2 Fiscal rule regarding newly issued debt
The government conforms to two distinct fiscal policy rules regarding newly is-
sued debt and pension payments. Let us first explain the fiscal rule regarding
newly issued debt. The government borrows a specified fraction  of national
income Yt and attempts to hold the budget deficit-GDP ratio constant at :
Bt+1   Bt = Yt: (10)
This type of fiscal rule is employed in the EU and other OECD countries.7 Exist-
ing studies such as Bra¨uninger (2005) and Yakita (2008) also employ an analogous
assumption. We follow this tradition for the sake of simplicity in the following
analysis.
2.3.3 Fiscal rule regarding pension payments
Next, let us explain the fiscal rule regarding pension payments. To formulate
the transition from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme in
the simplest manner, as in Tabata (2015), the pension payment for old agents in
generation t   1, Pt, is determined by the following payment rule:
Pt =
"
 
Nt
Nt 1
 + (1   )
#
wt =
"
 
1 + n

 + (1   )
#
wt: (11)
Equation (11) indicates that the pension payment for old agents in generation
t   1, Pt, adjusted according to changes in the current generation’s wages wt (i.e.,
7Japanese law is supposed to limit the issuance of deficit-covering bonds. The government
is allowed to borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending (i.e., golden rule of public
finance). A special deficit-financing bill must be submitted for each fiscal year to issue deficit-
covering bonds. Because this paper does not consider public investment that explicitly benefits
future generations, in our context, Japanese fiscal law technically holds that the budget deficit-
GDP ratio  must be zero. However, this is far from reality. At present, Japanese government
intends to bring the primary balance into the black by 2020.
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wage indexation). The term  1+n

 + (1   ) denotes the replacement ratio for
the current generation’s wages wt. The replacement ratio is defined as a convex
combination of a demographic adjustment component (i.e.,  1+n

) and a fixed co-
ecient component (i.e., ). The index  2 [0; 1] measures the weight assigned
to the demographic adjustment component. A demographic adjustment compo-
nent (i.e.,  1+n

) characterizes a demographically modified indexation in which the
wage indexation rate for pension benefits automatically decreases with population
aging. In addition, the index  2 [0; 1) measures the size of pension payments in
the demographic adjustment component, whereas  2 [0; 1) measures the size of
pension payments in the fixed coecient component.
Given (11), suppose that  = 0, the per capita pension benefit of generation
t   1, is given simply by Pt = wt and that the wage replacement ratio is con-
stant  irrespective of the old-age dependency ratio 1+n . In this case, the PAYG
pension scheme is a pure defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio
 2 [0; 1). Next, suppose that  = 1, the per capita pension benefit of gener-
ation t   1, is fully adjusted in response to changes in demographic conditions
and satisfies the following equality condition:  wtNt = PtNt 1. As explained in
Appendix B, this equality condition is the well-known formulation of the govern-
ment budget constraint under a pure defined-contribution scheme. Therefore, in
this case, the PAYG pension scheme is a pure defined-contribution scheme with
a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1). Finally, suppose that  2 (0; 1). In this case,
the PAYG pension scheme is a convex combination of the two aforementioned
schemes. We denote this type of pension system as a mixed-payment scheme. Un-
der a mixed-payment scheme, as the value of  approaches 1, the weight assigned
to the defined-contribution component increases. Therefore, the transition from
a defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-
contribution scheme with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) is described simply
by the increase in the value of  from 0 to 1.
As explained in the Introduction, as many OECD countries employ demo-
graphically modified indexation programs, their PAYG pension systems possess
both defined-benefit and defined-contribution components. Our simple specifica-
tion enables us to capture this combination of attributes in a reduced-form man-
ner. Of course, our mixed-payment scheme is rather abstract and cannot capture
the complex structures of recent PAYG pension systems in their entirety. Never-
theless, this simple framework enables us to capture several realistic features of
recent pension reforms.
By dierentiating (11) with respect to n and , we obtain
@Pt
@n
8>><>>:> 0, for  2 (0; 1];= 0, for  = 0; (12)
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@Pt
@
8>><>>: 0, for 1+n    ;> 0, for 1+n <   : (13)
Equation (12) indicates that when a PAYG pension system is financed by a
pure defined-contribution scheme or a mixed-payment scheme (i.e.,  2 (0; 1]), a
decline in the population growth rate implies a lower per capita pension benefit.
However, when a PAYG pension system is financed by a pure defined-benefit
scheme (i.e.,  = 0), the per capita pension benefit is unaected by the population
growth rate.
Further, Equation (13) indicates that assigning a larger weight  to the defined-
contribution component implies a lower (resp. higher) per capita pension benefit
when (i) the old-age dependency ratio 1+n is relatively high (resp. low); (ii) the
fixed contribution rate  under a defined-contribution scheme is relatively small
(resp. large); or (iii) the fixed replacement ratio  under a defined-benefit scheme
is suciently large (resp. small) to satisfy 1+n >   (resp. 1+n <   ).
2.3.4 Determination of wage income tax rate
Finally, let us explain the endogenous determination of the wage income tax rate
t. Due to the budget deficit rule (10) and the pension payment rule (11), the level
of government spending and of newly issued debt have already been determined,
and thus, the wage income tax rate t has to be adjusted to meet the government
budget constraint (9). Hence, by substituting (7), (10) and (11) into (9) and divid-
ing it by wtNt, we obtain
t =

r
w¯
xt + ˜(; n)   1   

 (xt; ˜(; n)); (14)
where
˜(; n)    +  
1 + n
(1   ); (15)
xt  btkt and bt  BtNt . To focus our analysis on the case in which the wage income
tax is nonnegative for any positive value of the public debt-capital ratio xt, we
assume that the following parameter conditions hold.
˜(; n)  
1   : (A1)
Here, suppose there is no newly issued public debt (i.e.,  = 0) or any stock of
public debt (i.e., xt = 0); hence, the relationship t = ˜(; n) holds. Therefore,
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(A1) is more likely to hold when the wage tax rate in the no-public-debt case
˜(; n) is suciently high or the budget deficit-GDP ratio  is suciently low.
By dierentiating (14) with respect to n and , we obtain
@
@n
=
@˜(; n)
@n
8>><>>:< 0, for  2 [0; 1);= 0, for  = 1; (16)
@
@
=
@˜(; n)
@
8>><>>: 0, for 1+n    ;> 0, for 1+n <   : (17)
Equation (16) indicates that when a PAYG pension system is financed by a
pure defined-benefit scheme or mixed-payment scheme (i.e.,  2 [0; 1)), a decline
in the population growth rate implies a higher wage income tax rate. However,
when a PAYG pension system is financed by a pure-contribution scheme (i.e.,
 = 1), the wage income tax rate is unaected by the population growth rate.
Further, Equation (17) indicates that assigning a larger weight  to the defined-
contribution component implies a lower (resp. higher) wage income tax rate when
(i) the old-age dependency ratio 1+n is relatively high (resp. low); (ii) the fixed
contribution rate  under a defined-contribution scheme is relatively small (resp.
large); or (iii) the fixed replacement ratio  under a defined-benefit scheme is
suciently large (resp. small) to satisfy 1+n >   (resp. p1+n <   ).
3 General equilibrium and fiscal sustainability
This section characterizes the competitive equilibrium allocation of the economy.
Further, we explicitly define the concept of fiscal sustainability.
3.1 Market clearing and dynamics
First, let us consider the market equilibrium conditions. Noting that an arbitrage
opportunity exists between a real asset and bond, we can set the market clearing
condition for capital as Kt+1 + Bt+1 = stNt, which expresses the equality of the
total savings by young agents in generation t, stNt, to the sum of the stocks of
aggregate physical capital and aggregate public debt. Dividing both sides by Nt
leads to
(1 + n)(kt+1 + bt+1) = st: (18)
The commodity market clears automatically according to Walras’s law.
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Next, let us consider the dynamic properties of the economy, which are sum-
marized in Figure 1. First, we consider the dynamics of the public debt-labor ratio
bt. Dividing both sides of (10) by Nt and substituting (8) into it, we obtain the
dynamic evolution of the public debt-labor ratio bt as follows:
bt+1
bt
=
1
1 + n
bg(xt; ); (19)
where
bg(xt; )  1 + w¯1   
1
xt
:
From (19), we can confirm that the relationships @bg(xt;)
@xt
< 0, limxt!0 bg(xt; ) =
1, limxt!1 bg(xt; ) = 1 hold. In addition, bg(xt; ) satisfies the following prop-
erty: @bg(xt;)
@
> 0. This implies that a larger budget deficit-GDP ratio  shifts the
bg(xt; ) curve upward.
We then consider the dynamics of the capital-labor ratio kt. Using (15), the per
capita pension benefit Pt in (11) is rewritten as Pt = 1+n ˜(; n)wt. By substituting
(4), (6), (7), (14), (19) and Pt = 1+n ˜(; n)wt into (18) and rearranging it, we obtain
the dynamic evolution of the capital-labor ratio kt as follows:
kt+1
kt
=
1
1 + n
kg(xt; ˜(; n); ); (20)
where
kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) n
[1   ˜(; n)]   1 
o
w¯
1+   (1 + 1+r)xt
1 + 11+
w¯
R ˜(; n)
:
From (20), we can confirm that the relationships @kg(xt;˜(;n);)
@xt
< 0, limxt!0 kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) <
1, limxt!1 kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) =  1 hold. In addition, kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) satisfies the
following property: @kg(xt;˜(;n);)
@
< 0. This implies that a larger budget deficit-GDP
ratio  shifts the kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) curve downward.
The dynamics of this economy are completely described by the two dierence
equations of (19) and (20). Because the evolution of the capital-labor ratio kt and
the public debt-labor ratio bt depends upon the public debt-capital ratio xt, the
evolution of xt is given by the following:
xt+1
xt
=
bt+1
bt
kt+1
kt
=
bg(xt; )
kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) : (21)
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Here, note that the following inequality holds.
xt+1  xt,bg(xt; )  kg(xt; ˜(; n); ): (22)
The steady-state equilibrium is then characterized by the conditions that xt+1 =
xt = x or:
bg(x; ) = kg(x; ˜(; n); ): (23)
From (19), (20) and (23), in the steady-state equilibrium, the state variable kt and
bt grow at the same rate.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between bg(xt; ) and kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) where
there exist two steady state equilibria E1 and E2. Steady state E1 is characterized
by a lower public debt-capital ratio x1, whereas steady state E2 is characterized
by a higher public debt-capital ratio x2. Given the value of xt, kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) is
decreasing in , whereas bg(xt; ) is increasing in . Therefore, the case in which
two steady-state equilibria exist is likely to occur when the budget deficit-GDP
ratio  is suciently small.8 From Figure 1, the inequality kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) >
bg(xt; ) holds when x1 < xt < x2. In this region, because the capital-labor ratio
kt grows faster than the public debt-labor ratio bt, the public debt-capital ratio xt
decreases monotonically (i.e., xt+1
xt
< 1). However, when xt < x1 or xt > x2, the in-
equality kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) < bg(xt; ) holds. In these regions, the public debt-labor
ratio bt grows faster than the capital-labor ratio kt, and the public debt-capital
ratio xt increases monotonically (i.e., xt+1xt > 1). Therefore, if the initial public
debt-capital ratio x0 is below the critical level x2, the public debt-capital ratio
gradually converges to the steady state x1. Thus, steady state E1 is characterized
by a lower public debt-capital ratio x1 and locally stable. However, if the initial
public debt-capital ratio x0 is above the critical level x2, the public debt-capital ra-
tio xt increases monotonically, and the level of the capital-labor ratio kt decreases
from (20) and will go to zero within a finite number of periods.9 Once the level
of the capital-labor ratio kt reaches zero, there is no commodity in the economy,
and hence the value of government debt vanishes. Thus, such a situation can be
regarded as government bankruptcy.
Figure 2 illustrates the case in which no steady-state equilibrium exists. This
case is likely to occur when the budget deficit-GDP ratio  is suciently large. In
this case, as shown in Figure 2, the inequality bg(xt; ) > kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) holds
for all xt > 0. Thus, regardless of the initial public debt-capital ratio x0 > 0, the
public debt-capital ratio xt increases monotonically (i.e., xt+1xt > 1), and the level
of the capital-labor ratio kt decreases from (20) and goes to zero within a finite
8See Appendix C details on the the parameter conditions that ensure the existence of the steady-
state equilibria.
9See Appendix D for details on the stability property of the steady-state equilibria.
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number of periods. Hence, the economy always follows the path to government
bankruptcy.
Hereafter, for clarity of exposition, we focus our analysis on the case in which
there exist two steady-state equilibria given the demographic conditions (; n) and
fiscal policy parameters (;  ; ; ), as in the case of Figure 1.
3.2 Definition of fiscal sustainability
Before concluding this section, to clarify the following discussion, we explicitly
define the concept of fiscal sustainability as employed in our paper. Based upon
Arai (2011), we define the following two terms regarding the sustainability of
fiscal policy.
Definition 1 (a sustainable fiscal policy) A fiscal policy is sustainable if there
exists an initial value of the public debt-capital ratio such that the ratio converges
to some finite value in the long run.
Definition 2 (a more sustainable fiscal policy) A fiscal policy becomes more sus-
tainable if the range of the initial public debt-capital ratio for which the public
debt-capital ratio converges to some finite level widens due to changes in the fiscal
policy parameters (;  ; ; ) or demographic conditions (; n).
In our paper, as described in Figure 1, the steady-state value of x2 determines
the upper limit of the initial public debt-capital ratio below which the public debt-
capital ratio converges to a finite value of x1. This means that a higher value of x2
leads to a wider range of the initial public debt-capital ratio for which the public
debt-capital ratio converges to the finite value of x1. Therefore, we can state that
a fiscal policy becomes more (resp. less) sustainable if the value of x2 increases
(resp. decreases) due to changes in the fiscal policy parameters (;  ; ; ) or
demographic conditions (; n).
4 Fiscal sustainability
In this section, we examine how population aging caused by a decline in the pop-
ulation growth rate n influences the sustainability of a fiscal policy. We also con-
sider how reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-benefit scheme with
a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution scheme with a fixed
contribution rate  2 [0; 1) aects theoretical predictions of the eect of popula-
tion aging on fiscal sustainability.
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4.1 Population aging and fiscal sustainability
Let us first examine how population aging caused by a decline in the population
growth rate n influences the sustainability of a fiscal policy. From (19), a decline
in the population growth rate n has no eect on the bg(xt; ) curve. However,
given @kg
@˜
< 0 and (16), by dierentiating kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) in (20) with respect to
n, we obtain
@kg(xt; ˜(; n); )
@n
=
@kg
@˜|{z}
( )
@˜(; n)
@n
8>><>>:> 0, for  2 [0; 1);= 0, for  = 1: (24)
As described in Figure 3, Equation (24) indicates that when a PAYG pension
system is financed by a pure defined-benefit scheme or a mixed-payment scheme
(i.e.,  2 [0; 1)), a decline in the population growth rate shifts the kg(xt; ˜(; n); )
curve downward and thus increases the value of x1 and decreases the value of x2.
However, when a PAYG pension system is financed by a pure defined-contribution
scheme (i.e.,  = 1), a decline in the population growth rate n has no eect on the
kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) curve, and thus, both x1 and x2 remain unchanged. In fact, by
dierentiating (23) with respect to n, we obtain the following results:10
@x1(; n; )
@n
8>><>>:< 0, for  2 [0; 1);= 0, for  = 1; (25)
@x2(; n; )
@n
8>><>>:> 0, for  2 [0; 1);= 0, for  = 1: (26)
Equation (26) indicates that when a PAYG pension system is financed by a
pure defined-benefit scheme or a mixed-payment scheme (i.e.,  2 [0; 1)), a de-
cline in the population growth rate decreases the value of x2, reduces the range of
the initial public debt-capital ratio for which xt converges to x1 and thus makes a
fiscal policy less sustainable. In particular, an excessive decline in the population
growth rate n shifts the kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) curve downward substantially, which may
eliminate any steady-state equilibria as described in Figure 2. In this case, a fis-
cal policy is no longer sustainable for any positive initial public debt-capital ratio.
However, Equation (26) also indicates that when PAYG pension is financed by a
pure defined-contribution scheme (i.e.,  = 1), the value of x2 is unaected by the
population growth rate n. Therefore, a decline in the population growth rate does
not necessarily make a fiscal policy less sustainable.
10From (23), the steady state value of xi (i = 1; 2) depends upon the values of , n and . To
stress these relationships, we denote xi as xi (; n; ).
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These results indicate that population aging caused by a decline in the pop-
ulation growth rate may negatively aect the sustainability of a fiscal policy, but
the extent of its negative eect depends substantially on the type of PAYG pen-
sion scheme. The mechanism underlying these theoretical results is explained
as follows. Under a pure defined-benefit scheme or a mixed-payment scheme
(i.e.,  2 [0; 1)), from (14), a decline in the population growth rate n increases
the old-age dependency ratio 1+n , which positively aects the wage income tax
rate t. This higher wage income tax rate t leads to a lower rate of saving by
young individuals, which negatively aects capital accumulation and thus shifts
the kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) curve downward. We denote this negative eect of a de-
cline in n on capital accumulation the “tax burden eect”. Under a pure defined-
contribution scheme (i.e.,  = 1), however, the wage income tax rate is unaected
by the value of the old-age dependency ratio. Therefore, this “tax burden eect”
does not exist, and thus, the kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) curve is not aected by a decline in
the population growth rate.
4.2 PAYG pension reform and fiscal sustainability
Next, let us examine how reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-
benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution
with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) aects the sustainability of a fiscal policy.
In this paper, this type of pension reform is described by assigning an increased
weight  to the defined-contribution component. Given @kg
@˜
< 0 and (17), by
dierentiating kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) with respect to , we obtain
@kg(xt; ˜(; n); )
@
=
@kg
@˜|{z}
( )
@˜(; n)
@
8>><>>: 0, for 1+n    ;< 0, for 1+n <   : (27)
As described in Figures 4 and 5, Equation (27) indicates that when the con-
dition 1+n >
 

(resp. 1+n <   ) holds, an increase in the weight  assigned to the
defined-contribution component shifts the kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) curve upward (resp.
downward) and thus decreases (resp. increases) the value of x1 and increases
(resp. decreases) the value of x2. By dierentiating (23) with respect to , we
obtain the following results:
@x1(; n; )
@
8>><>>: 0, for 1+n    ;> 0, for 1+n <   ; (28)
@x2(; n; )
@
8>><>>: 0, for 1+n    ;< 0, for 1+n <   : (29)
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Equation (29) indicates that when the condition 1+n >   (resp. 1+n <   ) holds,
an increase in the weight  assigned to the defined-contribution component in-
creases (resp. decreases) the value of x2, expands (resp. contracts) the range of the
initial public debt-capital ratio for which xt converges to x1 and thus makes a fis-
cal policy more (resp. less) sustainable. Therefore, the transition from a defined-
benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution
scheme with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) positively (resp. negatively) af-
fects the sustainability of a fiscal policy when (i) the old-age dependency ratio 1+n
is relatively high (resp. low); (ii) the fixed contribution rate  under a defined-
contribution scheme is relatively small (resp. large); or (iii) the fixed replacement
ratio  under a defined-benefit scheme is suciently large (resp. small) to satisfy

1+n >
 

(resp. 1+n <   ).
The mechanism underlying these theoretical results is explained as follows.
Based on (13) and (17), when the condition 1+n >   (resp. 1+n <   ) holds, an in-
crease in the weight  assigned to the defined-contribution component negatively
(resp. positively) aects both per capita pension benefits and the wage income tax
rate. According to (20), the lower (resp. higher) wage income tax rate t and per
capita pension benefits Pt+1 motivate young individuals to save more (resp. less)
for their old age, which positively (resp. negatively) aects capital accumulation
and thus shifts the kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) curve upward (resp. downward).
Now, let us consider how reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-
benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution
scheme with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) aects theoretical predictions of
the eect of population aging on fiscal sustainability. Figure 6 depicts numerical
examples of the relationship between the population growth rate n and the steady-
state value of the debt-capital ratio x2 under alternative weights  on the defined-
contribution component (i.e.,  = 0, 0:3, 0:6 and 1). The parameters used in
the baseline simulations are as follows:  = 0:3,  = 1,  = 0:9, 1 + n = 0:8,
 = 0:3,  = 0:3,  = 0:01 and  = 14:71.11 Note that the objective of these
numerical examples is not to calibrate our simple model to actual data but to
supplement the qualitative results. The quantitative results obtained in this paper
11One period in this model is assumed to be approximately 30 years. Based on estimates of
the labor income share, we set the value of  at 0.3. The period life tables in Japan indicate
that in 2015, the probability of a man surviving to age 65 conditional on his reaching age 15 is
0.88. Thus, the benchmark value of the old-age survival probability  is set to 0.9. In addition,
to achieve a TFR of 1.6 per couple, the value of the gross population growth rate 1 + n is set to
0.8. To achieve a 30 % benefit level under a pure defined-benefit scheme, the value of the fixed
replacement ratio  is set to 0.3. Analogously, to achieve a 30% fixed contribution rate under a
pure defined-contribution scheme, the value of the fixed contribution rate  is set to 0.3. Moreover,
we set the value of  at 0:01 and the value of  at 1 to ensure the existence of two steady-state
equilibria. Finally, to achieve a 3% per capita GDP growth rate at benchmark values, the value of
 was adjusted to 14:71.
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should be interpreted with caution. Consistent with the results of (26), when  2
[0; 1) (i.e., under a pure defined-benefit scheme or a mixed-payment scheme), the
steady-state value of x2 decreases monotonically as the population growth rate
declines. However, when  = 1 (i.e., under a pure defined-contribution scheme),
the steady-state value of x2 remains the same irrespective of the value of the weight
 assigned to the defined-contribution component.12
Figure 6 also shows how the transition from a pure defined-benefit scheme
with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution scheme
with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) aects the relationship between the
population growth rate n and the steady-state value of x2. As shown in (29), this
type of PAYG pension reform positively (resp. negatively) aects the steady-state
value of x2 when

1+n >
 

(resp. 1+n <   ) or 1 + n <  (resp. 1 + n >  ). From
(14), given the value of xt, the overall wage income tax rates remain the same
regardless of the value of  when 1+n = 
 
. Therefore, based on (23), the steady-
state value of x2 remains the same regardless of the value of  when 1 + n =

 
,
as shown in Figure 6. However, (14) also means that when 1 + n < 
 
(resp.
1 + n > 
 
), the overall wage income tax rate decreases (resp. increases) with
the value of , which shifts the kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) curve upward (resp. downward).
Therefore, from (23), the steady-state value of x2 increases (resp. decreases) with
the value of .
These results suggest that in economies in which the population growth rate
is relatively low and the size of pensions under a defined-benefit scheme is su-
ciently large to satisfy 1+n < 
 
, the transition from a pure defined-benefit scheme
with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution scheme
with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) mitigates or overcomes the negative
eect of population aging (caused by a decline in the population growth rate)
on fiscal sustainability. The intuitions are explained as follows. Under (14) and
(15), giving a larger weight  to the defined-contribution component decreases the
impact of changes in the old-age dependency ratio on the wage income tax rate,
which alleviates the negative eect of a decline in n on fiscal sustainability due
to the tax burden eect. Therefore, in economies in which the population growth
rate is relatively low and the size of pensions under a defined-benefit scheme is
suciently large to satisfy 1+ n < 
 
, the transition from a defined-benefit scheme
with a fixed replacement ratio  to a defined-contribution scheme with a fixed
contribution rate  mitigates or even overcomes the negative eect of population
aging (caused by a decline in the population growth rate) on fiscal sustainability.
12Note that if the population growth rate is excessively low, the steady-state value of x2 cannot
be defined when  2 [0; 1) in our simulation because there are no steady-state equilibria, as shown
in Figure 2. In our baseline simulation, for example, if  = 0, the steady-state value of x2 cannot
be defined when 1 + n < 0:7.
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5 Economic growth
In this section, we examine how population aging caused by a decline in the pop-
ulation growth rate n aects economic growth. We also consider how reforming
a PAYG pension system from a defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement
ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution scheme with a fixed contribution rate
 2 [0; 1) aects theoretical predictions of the eect of population aging on eco-
nomic growth.
5.1 Population aging and economic growth
Let us first examine how population aging caused by a decline in the population
growth rate n aects economic growth. For simplicity, we focus our analysis on
the case in which the economy is in a stable steady-state equilibrium E1 in which
the state variables kt and bt grow at the same rate. In this case, from (8) and (20),
the gross per capita rate of output growth is described by
yt+1
yt
jxt=x1 =
kt+1
kt
jxt=x1 =
kg(x1(; n; ); ˜(; n); )
1 + n
 G(x1(; n; ); ˜(; n); n; ):
(30)
Then, given (16), (25), @G
@˜
< 0, @G
@x1
< 0 and @G
@n
< 0, by dierentiating (30) with
respect to n, we obtain
dG(x1(; n; ); ˜(; n); n)
dn =
@G
@˜|{z}
( )
@˜(; n)
@n
+
@G
@x1|{z}
( )
@x1(; n; )
@n
+
@G
@n|{z}
( )
: (31)
where
@G
@˜|{z}
( )
@˜(; n)
@n
8>><>>:> 0, for  2 [0; 1);= 0, for  = 1;
@G
@x1|{z}
( )
@x1(; n; )
@n
8>><>>:> 0, for  2 [0; 1);= 0, for  = 1:
Equation (31) indicates that when a PAYG pension system is financed by a
pure defined-benefit scheme or a mixed-payment scheme (i.e.,  2 [0; 1)), a de-
cline in the population growth rate n has two negative eects and one positive
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eect on capital accumulation. The first negative eect is the “tax burden ef-
fect,” which is reflected in the first and the second terms on the right-hand side
(RHS) of (31). Equation (14) implies that a decline in the population growth
rate n positively aects the wage income tax rate t in the following two ways.
First, a decline in n increases the dependency ratio 1+n , which positively aects
the wage income tax rate t. Second, a decline in n increases the debt-capital
ratio x1, as shown in (25), which positively aects the wage income tax rate t.
These two positive eects of a decline in n on t lead to a lower rate of saving
by young individuals, which negatively aects capital accumulation. The second
negative eect is the “substitution eect” from physical capital accumulation to
public debt-holding, which is reflected in the second term on the RHS of (31).
As shown in (25), a decline in the population growth rate n increases the steady-
state value of the public debt-capital ratio x1, which implies a shift in savings
from physical capital accumulation to public debt-holding. Thus, this substitution
eect negatively aects capital accumulation. The one positive eect is the “anti-
dilution eect,” which is reflected in the third term on the RHS of (31). From (30),
a decline in the population growth rate n increases the ratio of old to young in the
population, which mitigates the dilution of savings into a larger workforce. Thus,
this anti-dilution eect positively aects capital accumulation. However, Equa-
tion (31) also indicates that when a PAYG pension system is financed by a pure
defined-contribution scheme (i.e.,  = 1), the two aforementioned negative eects
of a decline in the population growth rate n on capital accumulation disappear and
only the positive “anti-dilution eect” exists. Therefore, when a PAYG pension
system is financed by a pure defined-contribution scheme (i.e.,  = 1), a decline in
the population growth rate n always increases the rate of per capita output growth.
Unfortunately, as the steady-state value of x1 is determined by a somewhat
complicated form of the implicit function shown in (23), it is dicult to further
investigate this issue analytically. Therefore, in the next subsection, we provide
some numerical examples. However, to clarify the following discussion, in the
next subsection, we first examine how reforming a PAYG pension system from a
pure defined-benefit scheme (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution scheme
(i.e.,  = 1) aects economic growth.
5.2 PAYG pension reform and economic growth
Let us then examine how reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-
benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution
with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) aects economic growth. For simplicity,
we again focus our analysis on the case in which the economy is in the stable
steady-state equilibrium E1.
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Given (17),(28), @G
@˜
< 0 and @G
@x1
< 0, by dierentiating (30) with respect to ,
we obtain
dG(x1(; n; ); ˜(; n); n; )
d =
@G
@˜|{z}
( )
@˜(; n)
@
+
@G
@x1|{z}
( )
@x1(; n; )
@
8>><>>: 0, for 1+n    ;< 0, for 1+n <   :
(32)
where
@G
@˜|{z}
( )
@˜(; n)
@
8>><>>: 0, for 1+n    ;< 0, for 1+n <   ;
@G
@x1|{z}
( )
@x1(; n; )
@
8>><>>: 0, for 1+n    ;< 0, for 1+n <   :
Equation (32) indicates that an increase in the weight  assigned to the defined-
contribution component positively (resp. negatively) aects economic growth
when (i) the old-age dependency ratio 1+n is relatively high (resp. low); (ii) the
fixed contribution rate  under a defined-contribution scheme is relatively small
(resp. large); or (iii) the fixed replacement ratio  under a defined-benefit scheme
is suciently large (resp. small) to satisfy 1+n >   (resp. 1+n <   ).
The mechanism underlying these theoretical results is explained as follows.
Based on (13) and (17), when the condition 1+n >   (resp. 1+n <   ) holds, an in-
crease in the weight  assigned to the defined-contribution component negatively
(resp. positively) aects both per capita pension benefits and the wage income
tax rate. According to (20), the lower (resp. higher) wage income tax rate t and
per capita pension benefits Pt+1 motivate young individuals to save more (resp.
less) for their old age, which positively (resp. negatively) aects capital accumu-
lation and economic growth. This eect is reflected in the first term on the RHS
of (32). Moreover, from (28), an increase in the weight  assigned to the defined-
contribution component induces a shift in savings from public debt-holding to
physical capital accumulation (resp. from physical capital accumulation to public
debt-holding), which also positively (resp. negatively) aects capital accumula-
tion and economic growth. This eect is reflected in the second term on the RHS
of (32).13
Now, let us consider how reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-
benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution
13In our simple model, as inferred from (30), any policy that reduces the size of the PAYG
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scheme with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) aects theoretical predictions of
the eect of population aging on economic growth. Figure 7 provides numerical
examples of the relationship between population growth n and the rate of per
capita output growth under alternative weightings  on the defined-contribution
component (i.e.,  = 0, 0:3, 0:6 and 1). Here, note that the rate of per capita
output growth in period t is given by gt = ( kt+1kt )
1
30   1 because one period in this
model is assumed to be approximately 30 years. Consistent with the results of
(31), when  = 1 (i.e., under a pure defined-contribution scheme), the rate of
per capita output growth increases monotonically as the population growth rate
declines. Moreover, when  2 [0; 1) (i.e., under a pure defined-benefit scheme
or a mixed-payment scheme), there is a hump-shaped relationship between the
population growth rate and the rate of per capita output growth.
This hump-shaped relationship between the population growth rate and the
rate of per capita output growth is intuitively explained as follows. As discussed
in Section 5-1, when a PAYG pension system is financed by a pure defined-benefit
scheme or a mixed-payment scheme (i.e.,  2 [0; 1)), a decline in the population
growth rate n has two negative eects (i.e., the “tax burden eect” and “substi-
tution eect”) and one positive eect (i.e., the “anti-dilution eect”) on capital
accumulation. Based on (23) and (30), it is straightforward to expect that the ef-
fect of decreasing n is likely to be negative under a pure defined-benefit scheme
or a mixed-payment scheme (i.e.,  2 [0; 1)), when n is extremely small. Because
the ratio of old to young people is large, the positive anti-dilution eect becomes
negligible. However, because the wage income tax rate is high due to the high
dependency ratio and the high public debt-capital ratio, any increase in the wage
income tax burden stemming from a decline in the population growth rate n causes
a considerable negative impact on capital accumulation. Therefore, when n is ex-
tremely small, the negative tax burden eect and substitution eect are likely to
dominate the positive anti-dilution eect. Conversely, the eect of decreasing n is
likely to be positive when n is extremely large. Because the ratio of old to young
in the population is small, the positive anti-dilution eect is exacerbated. How-
ever, because the wage income tax rate is low due to the low dependency ratio and
the low public debt-capital ratio, the negative tax burden eect and substitution
eect become negligible. Therefore, when n is extremely large, the positive anti-
dilution eect is likely to dominate the negative tax burden eect and substitution
pension leads to higher rates of capital accumulation and economic growth. Therefore, ceteris
paribus, a reduction in the fixed contribution rate  or fixed replacement ratio  positively aects
economic growth. Unlike these straightforward pension reduction policies, the eect of a transition
from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme on the overall size of the PAYG
pension and economic growth depends on the extent of population aging. These features suggest
that this type of PAYG pension reform may have a non-trivial impact on the relationship between
population aging and economic growth.
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eect.
Figure 7 also shows how the transition from a pure defined-benefit scheme
with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution scheme
with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) aects the relationship between the
population growth rate and the rate of per capita output growth. As shown in (32),
this type of PAYG pension reform positively (resp. negatively) aects economic
growth when 1+n >
 

(resp. 1+n <   ) or 1 + n <  (resp. 1 + n >  ). As
explained in Section 4-2, when 1 + n = 
 
, the both steady-state value of x1 and
the wage income tax rate remain the same regardless of the value of . Therefore,
when 1 + n = 
 
, based on (30), the rate of per capita output growth also remains
unchanged regardless of the value of , as shown in Figure 7. However, when
1 + n < 
 
(resp. 1 + n > 
 
), as (17) and (28) hold, both the value of x1 and the
wage income tax rates decrease (resp. increase) with the value of . Therefore,
the rate of per capita output growth increases (resp. decreases) with the value of
.
These results suggest that in economies in which the population growth rate
is relatively low and the size of pensions under a defined-benefit scheme is su-
ciently large to satisfy 1+n < 
 
, the transition from a pure defined-benefit scheme
with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution scheme
with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) mitigates or overcomes the negative
growth eect of population aging caused by a decline in the population growth
rate.14 The intuitions are explained as follows. Under (14), assigning a larger
weight  to the defined-contribution component decreases the impact of changes
in the old-age dependency ratio on the wage income tax rate, which alleviates
the negative growth eect of a decline in n due to the tax burden eect. More-
over, from (28), a larger weight  assigned the defined-contribution component
induces a shift in savings from public debt-holding to physical capital accumula-
tion, which weakens the negative growth eect of a decline in n due to the substi-
14In economies in which the population growth rate is relatively high and the size of pensions
under a defined-benefit scheme is suciently small to satisfy 1 + n > 
 
, the transition from
a pure defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-
contribution scheme with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) exerts competing influences on
the growth eect of population aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate. Based
on (14), assigning a larger weight  to the defined-contribution component decreases the impact
of a change in the old-age dependency ratio on the social security tax rate, which alleviates the
negative growth eect of a decline in n due to the tax burden eect. However, from (28), a larger
weight  of the defined-contribution component induces a shift in savings from physical capital
accumulation to public debt-holding, which strengthens the negative growth eect of a decline
in n due to the substitution eect. Furthermore, when 1 + n > 
 
, (13) and (17) indicate that
an increase in the weight  assigned to the defined-contribution component increases the size of
PAYG pensions and decreases savings, which weakens the positive growth eect of a decline in n
due to the anti-dilution eect.
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tution eect. Furthermore, when 1+n < 
 
, (13) and (17) indicate that an increase
in the weight  assigned to the defined-contribution component decreases the size
of PAYG pensions, and increases savings, which strengthens the positive growth
eect of a decline in n due to the anti-dilution eect. These factors mitigate the
negative growth eect of population aging caused by a decline in the population
growth rate. Therefore, in economies in which the population growth rate is rela-
tively low and the size of pensions under a defined-benefit scheme is suciently
large to satisfy 1 + n < 
 
, the transition from a defined-benefit scheme with a
fixed replacement ratio  to a defined-contribution scheme with a fixed contribu-
tion rate  mitigates or even overcomes the negative growth eect of population
aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate.
The prediction that reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-benefit
scheme to a defined-contribution scheme mitigates the negative growth eect of
population aging has already been recognized in Artige et al. (2014) and Tabata
(2015). With explicit consideration of public debt financing, this paper confirms
that the analogous predictions hold when the government conforms to a constant
budget deficit-GDP ratio rule.
6 PAYG pension reform and welfare
In this section, we examine how reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-
benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution
with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) aects the welfare level of each genera-
tion. Unfortunately, because it is dicult to investigate this issue analytically, this
section only provides a numerical example.
We consider the following policy experiment. Initially, the economy is in
the stable steady-state equilibrium in which the old-age dependency ratio is su-
ciently high to satisfy 1+n >
 

and the government employs a pure defined-benefit
scheme (i.e.,  = 0). Then, in period 5, the government reforms the PAYG pension
system from a defined-benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme. More
concretely, in period 5, the weight  assigned to the defined-contribution compo-
nent is increased from 0 to , where  = 0:3; 0:6; 1, and remains constant at 
for all t  5 (i.e., t =  for all t  5).
Figures 8-1 to 8-3 show how the increased weight  assigned to the defined-
contribution component in period t  5 influences the evolution of the wage in-
come tax rate t, the rate of per capita output growth gt and the public debt-capital
ratio xt, respectively. The solid line depicts the case without PAYG pension re-
form, whereas the broken, dot-dash and dotted lines reflect the case in which the
weight  is increased from 0 to 0.3, 0.6 and 1, respectively. Here, note that the
rate of per capita output growth in period t is given by gt = ( kt+1kt )
1
30   1.
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Because we consider the case in which the old-age dependency ratio is suf-
ficiently high to satisfy 1+n >
 

, from (13) and (17), such a policy experiment
negatively aects the per capita pension benefit Pt in period t  5 and the wage
income tax rate in period t  5. Thus, as shown in Figure 8-1, the wage income
tax rate begins to decrease in period 5. Moreover, the decline in the per capita pen-
sion benefit in period t  5 and the resulting decline in the wage income tax rate
in period t  5 motivate individuals in generation t  4 to save more for their old
age, which enhances the speed of capital accumulation in period t  4.15 Thus, as
shown in Figure 8-2, the rate of per capita output growth begins to increase in pe-
riod 4. Furthermore, from (21), the higher growth rate of the capital-labor ratio in
period t  4 negatively aects the public debt-capital ratio in period t  5. Thus,
as shown in Figure 8-3, the public debt-capital ratio begins to decrease in period
5. This decline in the public debt-capital ratio in period t  5 induces a further
decline in the wage income tax rate in period t  5. Thus, as shown in Figures 8-2
and 8-3, the rate of per capita output growth increases over time, whereas the pub-
lic debt-capital ratio decreases over time, and each of them gradually converges to
its own new steady-state value.
Figure 8-4 depicts the net lifetime utility gain or loss of agents belonging to
generations 1–7 (seven generations) and describes how the lifetime utility lev-
els of the agents are aected by the increased weight  assigned to the defined-
contribution component in period t  5. The solid line depicts the case without
PAYG pension reform, whereas the broken, dot-dash and dotted lines reflect the
welfare dierences between  = 0:3, 0:6, 1 and 0, respectively. As shown in Fig-
ure 8-4, the increased weight  assigned to the defined-contribution component in
period t  5 reduces the lifetime utility levels of agents in generation 4, while it
increases the lifetime utility levels of agents in generation t  5. This implies that
reforming the PAYG pension system from a defined-benefit scheme with a fixed
replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution with a fixed contribution
rate  2 [0; 1) deteriorates the welfare of the initial old agents in period 5, while
it improves the welfare of other, subsequent generations.
These results are intuitively explained as follows. The increased weight 
assigned to the defined-contribution component in period t  5 negatively aects
the per capita pension benefit in period t  5, which reduces the lifetime utility
level of agents in generation t  4. We denote this negative eect of an increase
in  on the welfare of agents in generation t  4 as the “pension reduction eect.”
Because agents in generation 4 (the initial old agents in period 5) are only aected
by this negative “pension reduction eect,” the lifetime utility level of agents in
15We consider the case in which the PAYG pension reform in period t  5 is expected by the
agents in generation 4 in their young age. Even if we consider the case in which the PAYG pension
reform is unexpected by agents in generation 4, the main implication of our welfare analysis is not
significantly changed.
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generation 4 is deteriorated by the increased weight  assigned to the defined-
contribution component in period t  5. However, the increased weight  assigned
to the defined-contribution component in period t  5 reduces the wage income
tax rate in period t  5, directly or indirectly, through the decline in the public
debt-capital ratio in period t  5, which positively aects the lifetime utility level
of agents in generation t  5. We denote this positive eect of an increase in  on
the welfare of agents in generation t  5 as the “tax reduction eect.” Moreover,
this decline in wage income tax rate in period t  5 leads to a higher capital-
labor ratio in period t  5, which also positively aects the lifetime utility level
of agents in generation t  5. We denote this positive eect of an increase in 
on the welfare of agents in generation t  5 as the “capital accumulation eect.”
Generation 5 and subsequent generations are aected not only by the negative
“pension reduction eect” but also the positive “tax reduction eect” and “capital
accumulation eect.”Therefore, in our example, these two positive welfare eects
dominate the one negative welfare eect, and thus the lifetime utility level of
agents in generation t  5 is improved by the increased weight  assigned to the
defined-contribution component in period t  5. Furthermore, as the increased
weight  assigned to the defined-contribution component in period t  5 increases
the savings level of all generations born after period 4, over time, the impact of
increased saving by successive generations increases. Thus, the positive “capital
accumulation eect” increases over time. Therefore, the welfare gain due to the
increased weight  in period t  5 increases for future generations.
Finally, Figure 9 depicts how population aging caused by a decline in the pop-
ulation growth rate influences the intergenerational conflict between current and
future generations over PAYG pension reform policy. The solid line reflects the
case without PAYG pension reform, whereas the broken, dot-dash and dotted lines
illustrate the welfare dierences between  = 1 and 0, when 1+ n = 0:85, 0:8 and
0:75, respectively. As shown in Figure 9, as the population growth rate decreases,
the net welfare losses of generation 4 tend to be large while the net welfare gains
of generation 5 and subsequent generations become large. Consequently, popula-
tion aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate exacerbates the extent
of intergenerational conflict over PAYG pension reform policy.
This result is intuitively explained as follows. In our model, when the con-
dition 1+n >
 

holds, the positive “capital accumulation eect” increases in the
decline in the population growth rate. This result is explicitly shown in Figure
7. Therefore, given the value of  (i.e., the extent of PAYG pension reform), as
the population growth rate decreases, the positive “capital accumulation eect”
increases, and thus, the net welfare gains of generation 5 and subsequent genera-
tions increase. However, from (12), the per capita pension benefit decreases with
the decline in the population growth rate. Therefore, given the value of  (i.e., the
extent of PAYG pension reform), as the population growth rate decreases, the neg-
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ative “pension reduction eect” becomes more serious, and thus, the net welfare
losses of generation 4 increase. These eects lead to an increase in the net welfare
losses of generation 4 and an increase in the net welfare gains of generation t  5.
These results imply that reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-
benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme becomes more politically di-
cult in a rapidly aging society. Thus, as in the conventional discussion of social
security reform, a Pareto-improving policy must be designed to enhance its po-
litical feasibility. Considering such a Pareto-improving policy will be one of the
promising directions for future research.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper examined how reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-
benefit scheme to a defined-contribution scheme aects fiscal sustainability and
economic growth in an OLG model with endogenous growth. We showed that
in economies in which the old-age dependency ratio is high and the size of pen-
sion benefits under a defined-benefit scheme is large, such a pension reform miti-
gates the negative eect of population aging on fiscal sustainability and economic
growth. However, we also showed that this type of pension reform entails an
intergenerational conflict of interest between current and future generations. Pop-
ulation aging might exacerbate the extent of this conflict.
Appendix A: Population aging caused by an increase
in the old-age survival probability rate 
In this section, we examine how population aging caused by an increase in the old-
age survival probability rate  aects fiscal sustainability and economic growth.
We also consider how reforming a PAYG pension system from a defined-benefit
scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  2 [0; 1) to a defined-contribution scheme
with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1) aects theoretical predictions of the eect
of population aging (caused by an increase in the old-age survival probability rate
) on fiscal sustainability and economic growth.
Fiscal sustainability
Figure 10 provides numerical examples of the relationship between the old-age
survival probability rate  and the steady-state value of the debt-capital ratio x2
under alternative weightings  assigned to the defined-contribution component
(i.e.,  = 0, 0:3, 0:6 and 1). The parameters used in the baseline simulations
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are the same in Figures 6 and 7. As inferred from (23), when the value of  is
relatively low, there is a hump-shaped relationship between the old-age survival
probability rate and the steady-state value of x2. This result implies that the eect
of population aging caused by an increase in  on fiscal sustainability is positive
when the old-age survival probability rate  is suciently low, but it could be
negative when the old-age survival probability rate  is suciently high. Figure
10 also shows how the transition from a pure defined-benefit scheme with a fixed
replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure defined-contribution scheme with a
fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) aects the relationship between the old-age
survival probability rate  and the steady-state value of x2. As shown in (29), this
type of PAYG pension reform positively (resp. negatively) aects the steady-state
value of x2 when

1+n >
 

(resp. 1+n <   ) or  >  (1+n) (resp.  <  (1+n) ).
From (14), given the value of xt, the overall wage income tax rates remain the
same regardless of the value of  when  =  (1+n)

. Therefore, based on (23),
the steady-state value of x2 remains the same regardless of the value of  when
 =  (1+n)

, as shown in Figure 10. However, (14) also means that when  >  (1+n)

(resp.  <  (1+n)

), the wage income tax rate decreases (resp. increases) with
the value of , which shifts the kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) curve upward (resp. downward).
Therefore, from (23), the steady-state value of x2 increases (resp. decreases) with
the value of . These results suggest that in economies in which the old-age
survival probability rate is relatively high and the size of pensions under a defined-
benefit scheme is suciently large to satisfy  >  (1+n)

, the transition from a pure
defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure
defined-contribution scheme with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) mitigates
or overcomes the negative eect of population aging (caused by an increase in the
old-age survival probability rate) on fiscal sustainability.
Economic growth
As in Section 5, we focus our analysis on the case in which the economy is in
a stable steady-state equilibrium E1. Figure 11 provides numerical examples of
the relationship between the old-age survival probability rate  and the rate of
per capita output growth under alternative weightings  assigned to the defined-
contribution component (i.e.,  = 0, 0:3, 0:6 and 1). The parameters used in the
baseline simulations are the same in Figures 6 and 7. As inferred from (30), when
the value of  is relatively low, there is a hump-shaped relationship between the
old-age survival probability rate and the rate of per capita output growth. This
result implies that the growth eect of population aging caused by an increase in
the old age survival rate  is positive when the old-age survival probability rate 
is suciently low, but it could be negative when the old-age survival probability
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rate  is suciently high. Figure 11 also shows how the transition from a pure
defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0) to a pure
defined-contribution scheme with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1) aects
the relationship between the old-age survival probability rate and the rate of per
capita output growth. As shown in (32), this type of PAYG pension reform posi-
tively (resp. negatively) aects economic growth when 1+n >   (resp. 1+n <   )
or  >  (1+n)

(resp.  <  (1+n)

). As explained in Section 4-2, when  =  (1+n)

,
the both steady-state value of x1 and the wage income tax rates remain the same
regardless of the value of . Therefore, when  =  (1+n)

, based on (30), the per
capita output growth rate also remains the same regardless of the value of , as
shown in Figure 11. However, when  >  (1+n)

(resp.  <  (1+n)

), as (17) and (28)
hold, both the value of x1 and the wage income tax rate decrease (resp. increase)
with the value of . Therefore, the rate of per capita output growth increases (resp.
decreases) with the value of . These results suggest that in economies in which
the old-age dependency ratio is relatively high and the size of pensions under a
defined-benefit scheme is suciently large to satisfy  >  (1+n)

, the transition
from a pure defined-benefit scheme with a fixed replacement ratio  (i.e.,  = 0)
to a pure defined-contribution scheme with a fixed contribution rate  (i.e.,  = 1)
mitigates or overcomes the negative growth eect of population aging caused by
a increase in the old-age survival probability rate.
Appendix B: PAYG pension system characterized by
a pure defined- contribution scheme with a fixed con-
tribution rate  2 [0; 1)
Under a pure defined-contribution scheme with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1),
all PAYG pension payments must be financed by contributions. Therefore, the
PAYG pension system must satisfy the following balanced-budget constraint:
 wtNt = PtNt 1: (33)
Thus, we can confirm that the relationship Pt =  1+n wt holds, which corresponds
to the value of Pt in (11) when  = 1.
Further, the budget constraints of integrated government (including the PAYG
pension system) in period t is given as
Bt+1 = (1 + r)Bt + PtNt 1   (ˆt +  )wtNt; (34)
where ˆt denotes the wage income tax imposed to finance interest payments on
debt minus newly issued debt (i.e., rBt   (Bt+1   Bt)). By substituting (7),(8),(10)
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and (33) into (34), we obtain
ˆt +  =
r
w¯
xt +    1   ; (35)
which corresponds to the value of t in (14) when  = 1. Therefore, when  = 1,
the PAYG pension scheme is characterized by a pure defined-contribution scheme
with a fixed contribution rate  2 [0; 1).
Appendix C: Existence of steady-state equilibria
In this appendix, we briefly consider the parameter conditions that ensure the
existence of steady-state equilibria. Rewriting (23) as a quadratic functional form,
we obtain
 (x; ˜(; n); )  1x2   2(˜(; n); )x + 3(˜(; n); ) = 0; (36)
where
1  1 + 1 + r > 0;
2(˜(; n); ) 

[1   ˜(; n)]   
1   

w¯
1 + 
 
 
1 +
1
1 + 
w¯
R
˜(; n)
!
;
3(˜(; n); ) 
 
1 +
1
1 + 
w¯
R
˜(; n)
!

1   w¯ > 0:
In addition, the inequalities @2(˜(;n);)
@
< 0 and @3(˜(;n);)
@
> 0 hold. As inferred
from Figure 1, as we confine our attention to the case in which the gross rate of
per capita output growth is positive (i.e., kg(xt; ˜(; n); ) > 0), the steady-state
equilibria exist if and only if the quadratic equation (36) has real roots or the dis-
criminant of the quadratic equation (36), D = [2(˜(; n); )]2 413(˜(; n); ) 
D(˜(; n); ), is non-negative. From D(˜(; n); ), we can confirm that the follow-
ing relations hold.
lim
!0
D(˜(; n); ) = [2(˜(; n); 0)]2 > 0;
@D(˜(; n); )
@
= 22
@2(˜(; n); )
@
  41@3(˜(; n); )
@
< 0 if 2(˜(; n); )  0:
These results imply that, assuming that the relationship 2(˜(; n); )  0 holds,
the condition D(˜(; n); ) > 0 holds for suciently small values of . The pa-
rameter conditions that ensure 2(˜(; n); )  0 are given by
1 
n
[1   ˜(; n)]   1 
o
w¯
1+
1 + 11+
w¯
R ˜(; n)
 kg(0; ˜(; n); )
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From (20), these parameter conditions imply that net growth rate of aggregate
capital is positive when there is no given stock of public debt. In this paper,
we implicitly confine our analysis to the case in which the parameter condition
kg(0; ˜(; n); )  1 holds.
Appendix D: Stability of steady-state equilibria
In this appendix, we investigate the stability of steady states E1 and E2 and show
that E1 is locally stable and E2 is unstable, or
 dxt+1dxt  < 1 holds at x1 and  dxt+1dxt  > 1
holds at x2.
By dierentiating (21) with respect to xt, we obtain
dxt+1
dxt
=
bg
kg +
xt
kg
@bg
@xt
  bgkg
xt
kg
@kg
@xt
:
Because bg = kg holds in the steady-state equilibria, at the steady-state value x
(x = x1; x2), the dierential simplifies to
dxt+1
dxt

xt+1=xt=x
= 1 +
x
kg
 
@bg
@xt

xt=x
  @kg
@xt

xt=x
!
: (37)
From Figure 1, the inequalities @bg
@x
< @kg
@x
< 0 (@kg
@x
< @bg
@x
< 0) hold at x1 (x2).
Therefore, dxt+1dxt < 1 holds at x

1, and
dxt+1
dxt > 1 holds at x

2. Then, by dierentiating
bg(xt; ) with respect to xt and evaluating at the steady states, we obtain
@bg
@xt

xt=x
=   w¯
1   
1
(x)2 :
In addition, rearranging (23) yields
  w¯
1   
1
(x)2 =
1
x

1   kg(x; ˜(; n); ) :
By substituting these two equations into (37), we obtain
dxt+1
dxt

xt+1=xt=x
=
x
kg
 
1
x
  @kg
@xt

xt=x
!
> 0; * @kg
@xt
< 0:
Therefore,
 dxt+1dxt  < 1 holds at x1, and  dxt+1dxt  > 1 holds at x2. Hence, E1 is locally
stable, whereas E2 is unstable.
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Figure 1: Two steady states in the case where  is small
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Figure 2: No steady state in the case where  is large
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Figure 3: The eect of an decline in n.
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Figure 4: The eect of the PAYG pension reform from a defined-benefit scheme
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Figure 5: The eect of the PAYG pension reform from a defined-benefit scheme
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Figure 6: The eect of the PAYG pension reform from a defined-benefit scheme
to a defined-contribution scheme on the relation between population growth rate
and the value of x2.
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Figure 7: The eect of the PAYG pension reform from a defined-benefit scheme
to a defined-contribution scheme on the relation between population growth rate
and economic growth.
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Figure 8: The eect of the PAYG pension reform on the dynamic evolutions of t,
gt and xt.
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Figure 9: Population aging and intergenerational conflicts.
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Figure 10: The eect of the PAYG pension reform from a defined-benefit scheme
to a defined-contribution scheme on the relation between old-age survival proba-
bility rate and the value of x2.
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Figure 11: The eect of the PAYG pension reform from a defined-benefit scheme
to a defined-contribution scheme on the relation between old-age survival proba-
bility rate and economic growth.
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